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Investment decisions with incomplete information
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Science and Technology, Mathematics and Computer Science, Department of Mathematics, Probability Theory and Combinatorics.ORCID iD: 0009-0002-8282-1090
2025 (English)Licentiate thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

In this licentiate thesis we consider three different stochastic control problems with incomplete information, where some agent gradually learns by observing a noisy observation process. In the first article we discuss a signaling game between an employer and an employee with an unknown capacity. We characterize an equilibrium in the form of a strategy for the salary claim and the possible firing time. Both the second and the third articles consider an irreversible investment into a project with an unknown project value. In the second one, an increased investment level speeds up future learning, whereas in the third an increased investment level gives an immediate push in the learning process.

Abstract [sv]

Detta examensarbete behandlar tre olika stokastiska kontrollproblem med dold information, där en agent gradvis lär sig genom att observera en brusig observationsprocess. I den första artikeln diskuterar vi ett signalspel mellan en arbetsgivare och en anställd med okänd kapacitet. Vi karaktäriserar en jämvikt i form av en strategi för löneanspråk och eventuell uppsägning. Den andra och den tredje artiklarna studerar en irreversibel investering i ett projekt med okänt projektvärde. I den andra påskyndar en ökad investeringsnivå framtida lärande, medan i den tredje en ökad investeringsnivå ger en omedelbar push i inlärningsprocessen.

Abstract [fi]

Tässä lisensiaatintyössä tarkastelemme kolmea stokastista optimointiongelmaa, missä päätöksen-tekijä oppii tarkastelemalla taustahälyistä havaintoprosessia epätäydellisen tiedon vallitessa. Ensimmäinen artikkeli käsittelee työnantajan ja tuntemattoman kyvyn omaavan työntekijän välistä signaalipeliä. Löydämme pelin tasapainotilan, joka koostuu palkkaehdotuksesta ja mahdollisesta irtisanomishetkestä. Toisessa ja kolmannessa artikkelissa tutkimme peruuttamattomia investointeja tuottavuudeltaan tuntemattomaan projektiin. Toisessa artikkelissa kasvava investointitaso nopeuttaa projektin arvoon liittyvää myöhempää oppimista, ja kolmannessa investoijan ymmärrys projektista lisääntyy välittömästi investoinnin yhteydessä.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Department of Mathematics, 2025.
Series
U.U.D.M. report / Uppsala University, Department of Mathematics, ISSN 1101-3591 ; 2025:2
National Category
Probability Theory and Statistics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-555137OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-555137DiVA, id: diva2:1953888
Presentation
2025-04-28, 80101, Ångström Laboratory, Uppsala, 13:15 (English)
Opponent
Supervisors
Available from: 2025-04-23 Created: 2025-04-23 Last updated: 2025-04-23Bibliographically approved
List of papers
1. Hiring and firing: a signaling game
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Hiring and firing: a signaling game
2025 (English)In: Journal of Applied Probability, ISSN 0021-9002, E-ISSN 1475-6072, Vol. 62, no 2, p. 697-711Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

We study a signaling game between an employer and a potential employee, where the employee has private information regarding their production capacity. At the initial stage, the employee communicates a salary claim, after which the true production capacity is gradually revealed to the employer as the unknown drift of a Brownian motion representing the revenues generated by the employee. Subsequently, the employer has the possibility to choose a time to fire the employee in case the estimated production capacity falls short of the salary. In this setup, we use filtering and optimal stopping theory to derive an equilibrium in which the employee provides a randomized salary claim and the employer uses a threshold strategy in terms of the conditional probability for the high production capacity. The analysis is robust in the sense that various extensions of the basic model can be solved using the same methodology, including cases with positive firing costs, incomplete information about an individual’s own type, as well as an additional interview phase.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Cambridge University Press, 2025
Keywords
Signaling game, asymmetric information, optimal stopping
National Category
Probability Theory and Statistics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-555107 (URN)10.1017/jpr.2024.93 (DOI)001353441200001 ()2-s2.0-85209737317 (Scopus ID)
Funder
Swedish Research Council
Available from: 2025-04-23 Created: 2025-04-23 Last updated: 2025-04-23Bibliographically approved
2. An irreversible investment problem with a learning-by-doing-feature
Open this publication in new window or tab >>An irreversible investment problem with a learning-by-doing-feature
(English)Manuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
National Category
Probability Theory and Statistics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-555108 (URN)
Available from: 2025-04-23 Created: 2025-04-23 Last updated: 2025-04-23Bibliographically approved
3. Learning from the past in an irreversible investment problem
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Learning from the past in an irreversible investment problem
(English)Manuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
National Category
Probability Theory and Statistics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-555109 (URN)
Available from: 2025-04-23 Created: 2025-04-23 Last updated: 2025-04-23Bibliographically approved

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