Open this publication in new window or tab >>2025 (English)In: Journal of Applied Probability, ISSN 0021-9002, E-ISSN 1475-6072, Vol. 62, no 2, p. 697-711Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]
We study a signaling game between an employer and a potential employee, where the employee has private information regarding their production capacity. At the initial stage, the employee communicates a salary claim, after which the true production capacity is gradually revealed to the employer as the unknown drift of a Brownian motion representing the revenues generated by the employee. Subsequently, the employer has the possibility to choose a time to fire the employee in case the estimated production capacity falls short of the salary. In this setup, we use filtering and optimal stopping theory to derive an equilibrium in which the employee provides a randomized salary claim and the employer uses a threshold strategy in terms of the conditional probability for the high production capacity. The analysis is robust in the sense that various extensions of the basic model can be solved using the same methodology, including cases with positive firing costs, incomplete information about an individual’s own type, as well as an additional interview phase.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Cambridge University Press, 2025
Keywords
Signaling game, asymmetric information, optimal stopping
National Category
Probability Theory and Statistics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-555107 (URN)10.1017/jpr.2024.93 (DOI)001353441200001 ()2-s2.0-85209737317 (Scopus ID)
Funder
Swedish Research Council
2025-04-232025-04-232025-04-23Bibliographically approved