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This dissertation investigates the relation between poetry and theory in the poetic practice of language writing. The topic is approached from the idea that language writing takes place in the tension of an open-ended state. In Chapter 1 it is argued that language writing is constituted in relation to a poetic context, and that it reactivates traits intrinsic to the avant-garde discourse, which corresponds to some characteristics in poststructuralism and critical theory. These perspectives appear in the poetic practice of language writing in terms of a rejection of transparency and separation. The stress on construction in language and writing eliminates the distinction between theory and poetry. It is argued that language writing cannot be seen as a movement in the traditional sense of the word since the poetic work resists aesthetic coherence. The heterogeneity of language writing confirms theory's contribution to the poetic practice but without creating a separation between the two. The first section of Chapter 2 addresses the l=a=n=g=u=a=g=e journal with a focus on a poetological context, avant-garde discourse, theory and criticism. The texts in this journal activate the open-ended state by acknowledging context and theory while they simultaneously reject the conventional style of the essay or the review. In the second section of this chapter, in the analysis of four language writers, Bruce Andrews, Charles Bernstein, Lyn Hejinian and Ron Silliman, it is argued that their poetic practice eliminates the distinction between poetry and poetics since poetry emerges as a critical study in itself, where self-reflexivity prevents the creation of poetry in a conventional sense and prevents a separation from poetics. Although poetry is connected with society, the autonomy of poetry, form and poetic language is stressed as a critical, transgressive potential in relation to conventional distinctions between poetry, theory, poetics and criticism.

Joseph Addison's (1672-1719) essays in The Spectator occupy contradictory positions in the history of aesthetics. While they are generally considered central to the institution of aesthetics as a scholarly discipline, their reception has throughout history entailed a strong questioning of their philosophical and scholarly importance. In the following paper, I consider this dual feature as regards reception, and set out to clarify how this has come about. A re-examination of the arguments advanced by Addison makes clear that his role is not that of a philosopher, but that of a public educator. As such he aims to raise the standard of general education of the British 'middling orders' in the early eighteenth century, and by using art for didactic purposes he seeks to contribute to the shaping of morally accomplished individuals.

One of the most original voices in British post-revolutionary philosophy belongs to the third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671–1713). Rather than supporting the Hobbesian and Lockean idea of modern political society as an artificially formed creation, Shaftesbury perceives society as a beneficial outcome of nature and natural rationality. Shaftes­bury’s understanding of natural society is furthermore entwined with aesthetic mat­ters. The aim of the following article is twofold. First, due to the fact that Shaftesbury’s ideas rarely are analysed in any detail by Swedish scholars, it offers an introduction to Shaftesbury’s take on the complex relation between society and poetry to readers of eighteenth-century intellectual history in general, and readers of the history of literature in particular. Second, given that Shaftesbury is frequently regarded as the first modern advocate of aesthetic autonomy, I wish to problematize such an account by showing how Shaftesbury opposes the idea that poetry holds an instrumental value for society, while he simultaneously maintains the inseparability of poetical truth, artistic whole, and political naturalism. As this article shows, the Promethean myth of creativity is central for Shaftesbury’s understanding of the relation between society and poetry.

The eighteenth century witnessed the historical change from aesthetic instrumentalism to aesthetic autonomy. Aesthetic research has often attempted to capture this change in teleological terms, wherein British aesthetic instrumentalism appears to contain the seeds of its own decline. The purpose of this article is to restore a balance between these two major historical modes of appreciating art, and to display the uniqueness of British aesthetic instrumentalism. During especially the first half of the eighteenth century, aesthetic instrumentalism was revitalised due to a new rationale for art in the reinforcement of a national body politic and in the strengthening of a British identity. In order to recognise the distinctiveness of aesthetic instrumentalism, as well as to acknowledge by what means it operated, I make essentially two claims: (1) aesthetic instrumentalism rediscovered its effective interaction with a national body politic by exploring a possible nexus between Britain and classical antiquity, and (2) although the philosophy of art advanced by Joseph Addison (1672-1719) frequently is held as a possible commencement of aesthetic autonomy, it was, first and foremost, characterised by a systematic aesthetic instrumentalism intended to reinforce the British body politic.

This dissertation studies the attraction of the sublime in British criticism during the eighteenth century, with particular emphasis on the arguments that served as precursors to the interest in the experience of the sublime.

The first part explores Samuel H. Monk’s standard work on the British eighteenth-century sublime, along with more recent studies. In order to expand the contextual features of Monk’s established account, and to be able to connect the sublime with the impact of the criticism of intellectual literature during the second half of the seventeenth century, this study needs to begin by considering the arguments put forth by Longinus in his treatise Peri Hupsous, a work that exerted considerable influence on eighteenth-century critics.

Thus, the second part addresses the relevance of the arguments made by Longinus, who reflected on the significance of the concentrated exercise of the imagination and drew attention to the inner carriage required to bring about the experience of the sublime. The third part, then, demonstrates the importance assigned by critics of the sublime to the intense exercise of the imagination. However, to fully understand the attraction of the Longinian sublime, this demonstration also needs to take into account the attention given to the exercise of the imagination in criticism of intellectual literature during the second half of the seventeenth century. Finally, I illustrate the relevance of including such criticism in the interpretation of the attraction of the sublime during the eighteenth century by considering Thomas Hobbes’ claims on the subject of the imagination.

Impermanence concerns every aspect of our lives, yet it goes unseen often for that same reason. In my dissertation, I wish to explain what impermanence is and delve into the role of impermanence in art. I will first dive into an explanation of what impermanence is, starting from the teaching of the Buddha, then introducing impermanence as a primary quality, highlighting its distinction from the manifestation or secondary qualities, e.g. change, movement, ageing. I will then investigate three examples of how impermanence can be utilised in art. The first case is the representation of impermanence in Jackson Pollock’s abstract paintings, for which I argue that what makes it possible is the inherently unstable appearance of the pieces combined with the artist’s intention and other variables. The second case is that of Anicka Yi’s exploitation of impermanence as a medium for her installations, borrowing Sherri Irvin’s comprehensive definition of medium. I will explain how Yi uses impermanence inside her art, and how she employs the quality in the piece in an effort to achieve her purpose, that of communication. The third and last case concerns the acceptance of the impermanent nature of the medium in street art, which will be pivotal in the achievement of the goal of subversiveness.

When listening to recorded music, we tend to hear properties which cannot be attributed to the musical work. For example, if I listen to Glenn Gould’s 1981 recording of Bach’s Goldberg Variations, I can hear Gould quietly humming along with the notes played on the keyboard. Further, if I listen to a recording of Bach’s Cello Suite no. 1 performed in Uppsala Cathedral, I am likely to hear the great reverberation in the church. Drawing on Bence Nanay’s concept of aesthetically relevant properties, I point to the fact that these features cannot be ignored, since attending to them seems to make an aesthetic difference in our experience of the music. This raises a fundamental question: if clearly audible properties such as Gould’s humming and the reverberation in Uppsala Cathedral cannot be attributed to the musical work, then to which musical phenomenon do we attribute these properties?

Bach did not specify the condition that the musician must vocalize spontaneously in order to perform the Goldberg Variations correctly. Neither did he specify the condition that a performance of his Cello Suite no. 1 must take place in a cathedral in order to be correct. According to the standard view, then, none of these properties can be attributed to the musical work. Therefore, audible properties such as spontaneous vocalizations and reverberations are commonly thought of as belonging to the performance of musical works.

In this thesis, I argue against the intuitive claim that these properties can be attributed to the performance. Instead, I propose that audible properties such as Gould’s humming and the reverberation in Uppsala Cathedral can be attributed to what I term the musical object, i.e. the perceptual object we encounter when listening to recorded music. The musical object is defined as the musical end-product created through performance, improvisation, or digital music-making, and is as such both transient and reproduceable. Thus, musical objects are distinct from (but may include) musical works.

If my proposal is correct, then we can explain how musical works, performances and recordings of music tend to be evaluated independently of each other.

This essay provides a thorough reading of Gilles Deleuze’s (1925–95) philosophy of nature and the way music relates to this philosophy. It does so with regards to changes in the view of nature in 20^th century science, especially in the theories of self-organisation as developed by, among others, Ilya Prigogine. Deleuze’s metaphysics is viewed in relation to these theories, and is also compared to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, which is related to classical science. The essay then investigates certain key issues in Deleuze’s philosophy concerning difference and univocity (or immanence), developed in his doctoral thesis Différence et répétition (1968). Also, certain aspects of the further evolution of this philosophy of immanence in Mille plateaux (1980), co-written with Félix Guattari, are examined. The essay then studies the role of aesthetics in Deleuze’s philosophy, and the way he transforms the aesthetics of Kant. The following chapter deals with Deleuze & Guattari’s primary text concerning music, ”De la ritournelle” in Mille plateaux. In this text, they develop a highly abstract concept of music, which, in their philosophy, is: 1) granted a cosmological reach regarding rhythms and motives; 2) made an essential aspect of the emergence of art, which they find in animals creating a territory (especially in the songbird); 3) used to discuss Baroque/Classicist, Romantic and 20^th century musical styles. Apart from analysing these aspects, this chapter focuses on 20^th century music, with a thorough examination of Gustav Mahler and of spectral music, demonstrating that Deleuze’s philosophy can deepen the understanding of this music. The chapter also discusses problematic tendencies in Deleuzian research on contemporary music, which does not take the entirety of Deleuze’s philosophy of nature into account. This essay argues that such knowledge is necessary to correctly examine the implications of Deleuze & Guattari’s philosophy of music. The lack of awareness of Deleuze’s philosophy of nature is also significant in the critique that Deleuze’s aesthetics has received by Jacques Rancière, which is analysed in the final chapter. This chapter also discusses Michael Gallope’s reading of Deleuze & Guattari, in which he makes a distinction between a metaphysical and an ethical-aesthetic philosophy of music. Although the relation between metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics, is key to understanding their philosophy of music, this essay argues that Gallope’s idea of what sort of music they advocate is incorrect.

Most people are in agreement that guilty pleasures exist, and that we feel them at some point in our life. In my masters thesis I am going to try and answer why guilty pleasure exists and if it should exist. I am going to do this by exploring three different types of situations where our aesthetic tastes may not align with what we think is correct to like. I will call these situations the self theory, the social theory and the moral theory. I will discuss each one in turn and suggest reasons for and against them, ultimately concluding that the moral theory is the only theory that gives good reasons to think that guilty pleasure is justified.

The idea that art is disruptive has ancient roots and is today ubiquitous. Its ubiquity in recent history is visible in the cultural policies of liberal and repressive states alike. While liberal governments have, by and large, fostered and protected artistic freedom as an engine of progress and societal self-criticism, repressive governments have restricted artistic freedom for the same reason.

Is the idea of art as intrinsically disruptive analytic or contingent? In this paper I will argue that while the phenomenology of aesthetic experience is in part intrinsically disruptive, it does not follow that the concept of art is also necessarily so. A large proportion of instances of artistic creativity, as well as our experience of it, is better understood in terms of compliance with cultural and aesthetic norms. Our intuitions to the contrary, I argue further, have more to do with the contingencies of twentieth-century history and the illusion of perpetual peace which governed its second half. The limits of this illusion are visible today both in art and politics.